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Abstract 
Renewable energy systems need to be able to make frequent and rapid adjust-
ments to address shifting solar and wind production.  This requires increasingly 
sophisticated industrial control systems (ICS). But, that also increases the po-
tential risks from cyber-attacks. Despite increasing attention to technical as-
pects (i.e., software and hardware) of cybersecurity, many professionals and 
scholars pay little or no attention to its organizational aspects, particularly to 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the status of cybersecurity within organizations. 
Given that cybersecurity decisions and policies are mainly made based on 
stakeholders’ perceived needs and security views, it is critical to measure such 
perceptions. In this paper, we introduce a methodology for analyzing differ-
ences in perceptions of cybersecurity among organizational stakeholders. To 
measure these perceptions, we first designed House of Security (HoS) as a 
framework that includes eight constructs of security: confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, technology resources, financial resources, business strategy, policy 
and procedures, and culture. We then developed a survey instrument to analyze 
stakeholders’ perceptions based on these eight constructs. In a pilot study, we 
used the survey with people in various functional areas and levels of manage-
ment in two energy and ICS organizations, and conducted a gap analysis to 
uncover differences in cybersecurity perceptions. This paper introduces the 
HoS and describes the survey instrument, as well as some of the preliminary 
findings. 
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Introduction 
Rising demand for renewable energy resources has led to a noticeable 
focus on undertaking technological innovations to expand the green energy in-
dustry and respond to demand. As a result, cybersecurity has emerged as a crit-
ical issue as the green energy sector faces growing cyber risks. For example, 
smart grids—which are meant to provide reliable and efficient power network 
systems to distribute renewable energy resources—open up more direct and in-
direct connections to the Internet and more connections among the nodes in the 
networks. Smart grids also require advanced computing and communication 
technologies [1]. Adding new sources of renewable energy to grids also re-
quires an increase in the frequency and speed of technological adjustments. 
Consequently, while enhanced features and functionalities are introduced, the 
networked systems become increasingly vulnerable [2, 3]. Other complications 
and vulnerabilities are also added with the Internet of Things (IoT), where in-
telligent devices are getting connected, as sensors and/or controllers, within en-
ergy networks. In fact, not only are vulnerabilities on the rise, but they also have 
the potential of becoming very sophisticated, given the unknown characteristics 
of new technologies. Because a great deal of attention is being focused on tech-
nological innovations in renewable energy systems, the cybersecurity research 
community has also focused mostly on the technical aspects. Overall, a similar 
trend is observed in energy companies as they face the challenges of the high 
cost of developing new technologies in a context of limitation of available re-
sources. As a result, it is not surprising that the organizational aspects of cyber-
security have become a blind spot for both industry and academia. 
Cybersecurity is an increasingly crucial and complex management is-
sue. Many organizations have developed cybersecurity policies to protect their 
business information and operational systems. Although these policies are im-
portant, they are often not fully adopted, the reasons being that organizations 
are limited by the resources they can devote to cybersecurity, and they often 
misunderstand the status of their cybersecurity. An organization’s goal should 
be to develop the best possible, most cost-effective approach to cybersecurity, 
which is further complicated by the different priorities of organizational stake-
holders. Stakeholders’ perceptions of cybersecurity play a critical role in 
achieving this goal, since they are the main source of decision-making. More-
over, as organizations evolve into extended enterprises, which includes ties 
with suppliers, customers, and other partners, there is a significant increase in 
the number of stakeholders, and a wider range of security complications and 
requirements.  
The current cybersecurity literature does not adequately address these 
issues. Many professionals and scholars have approached the study of cyberse-
curity by focusing specifically on the technical (e.g., hardware and software) 
and detailed elements of the security systems themselves, such as encryption 
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[4-6], firewall technologies [7-9], and antiviruses [10, 11], or have measured 
specific events, such as mean-time-to-failure. Although these efforts are neces-
sary, they often do not look at cybersecurity holistically and commonly neglect 
to consider its organizational aspects. They especially neglect to consider the 
perceived needs and security views of organizational stakeholders.  
In this paper, we introduce the MIT House of Security (HoS) frame-
work and present a survey instrument to measure stakeholders’ perceptions of 
cybersecurity. We seek to identify similarities and differences, both within and 
between different organizations. This research has three major objectives: 
 To identify how perceptions both shape, and should potentially shape, 
decisions about investments in security systems, with a particular focus 
on identifying the areas most in need of cybersecurity, as perceived by 
the individuals in the organization. 
 To identify perceived differences between importance and assessment 
of the HoS constructs among stakeholders. These differences are fur-
ther compared among individuals with different organizational roles 
and functional areas; e.g., comparing the views of mid-level managers 
to those of senior management, or the views of information technology 
(IT) or operational technology (OT) workers with those of other mem-
bers in the organization. 
 To identify differences between the importance and assessment of the 
HoS constructs among different organizations (e.g., comparing two dif-
ferent organizations). 
MIT’s House of Security 
Through a comprehensive literature review and several surveys, re-
searchers at MIT have divided cybersecurity issues primarily into eight meta-
groupings (i.e., constructs). Good security protects the “confidentiality” and 
“integrity” of data while providing “availability” of the data, networks, and sys-
tems to appropriate and authorized users, Confidentiality, integrity, and availa-
bility, also known as CIA, are often used as the only critical information char-
acteristics [12]. Good security practices also go beyond just technical solutions 
and are driven by a “business strategy,” with associated “policies and proce-
dures” for security, and are implemented in a “culture of security.” Moreover, 
these practices are supported by “technology resources” and “financial re-
sources” dedicated to security. These eight constructs form the proposed House 
of Security and are shown in Fig 1. 
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Fig 1. The eight constructs of the House of Security 
Survey Instrument 
The survey includes three questions related to each construct of HoS (a 
total of 24 questions). In each question, respondents are asked to specify their 
perception of both the level of “assessment” and “importance.” For example, 
they first respond to a question (e.g., “are people in the organization aware of 
good security practices?”), then identify the importance of that aspect. All ques-
tions are on a seven-point scale; “1” represents the smallest extent and “7” the 
largest extent.  
The survey questions do not explicitly identify the construct being 
measured, but relate to aspects of the construct. Furthermore, there are multiple 
questions for each construct that are ordered randomly. The individuals are not 
aware of the categorization of the questions across the eight constructs.  
A key part of this study involves gap analysis: how much does the per-
ception of the current state of a cybersecurity aspect differ from the perception 
of its importance. Such gaps help identify potential opportunities for improve-
ment within and across the extended enterprise. Differences in gaps among or-
ganizational stakeholders may represent different levels of understanding of se-
curity and help identify differences in local knowledge and needs.  
We evaluated the quality of the survey instrument by measuring the 
statistical significance of the questions and the constructs and the reliability of 
the constructs by computing Cronbach’s alpha [13]. While a key goal of our 
survey is to measure perceptions of the different constructs of security, we also 
plan to study the causes of these perception variations in our future research.  
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Preliminary Results of the Pilot Study 
For this pilot study, we distributed the survey broadly to members of 
two energy and ICS organizations, which we will refer to as organizations A 
and B. Respondents ranged from employees to top-level managers and across 
all major functional areas. This diversity was important in order to identify var-
iations in perceptions of cybersecurity. Here we briefly discuss some examples 
of the results based on: individual questions; constructs (i.e., a group of ques-
tions about an HoS construct); and construct gaps (i.e., the gap between assess-
ment and importance of a construct).  
 
Individual questions 
An example of the results of a question for organizations A and B are 
shown in Fig 2. The figure presents the assessment of a user (my perceived 
assessment, marked as MA), the importance (my perceived level of importance, 
marked as MI), and the gap between MA and MI. This illustrates that people in 
different organization can have very different perceptions regarding their or-
ganization’s cybersecurity. For example, for a question about well-defined and 
communicated cybersecurity strategy, there was a large gap (particularly in or-
ganization B), which implies that aspect falls far short of what is perceived to 
be needed among the respondents. Moreover, this example shows that organi-
zation A not only has a higher assessment about this question, but also they also 
have a higher expectation.  
 
Fig 2. Responses to a question on a seven-point scale: “The organization has a well-defined and 
communicated cybersecurity strategy.”  MA: my perceived assessment, MI: my perceived level 
of importance, Gap=MI-MA 
 
Constructs 
Beyond the individual questions, the results of the constructs present a 
more holistic overview. Each HoS construct contains three related questions, 
and the results of the questions are aggregated to present the construct. We have 
found, so far, that for a given organization, the assessment levels are likely to 
differ across the eight constructs, while the importance levels are often similarly 
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high. Comparing organizations, one can observe and study both similarities and 
differences between the organizations.  
The aggregated results of the eight constructs for organizations A and 
B are presented in Fig 31. The two organizations are relatively similar in their 
perceptions of availability, but differ noticeably in their perceptions of the state 
of policies and procedures for security—see Fig 3. At this point, we are not 
focusing on the specifications of organizations A and B. Obviously, there are 
other factors that might be at work, such as private vs. public company, large 
vs. small company, etc. Although these other factors may make it challenging 
to compare the organizations, these diagrams do provide important insights into 
the differences in perceptions. We will pursue these issues further in our next 
stage research with a larger number of organizations.  
 
 
Fig 3. Assessment vs. importance in organizations A and B 
 
 
Construct gaps 
Although viewing the values of each of the constructs provides some 
quick insights, it is often more intuitive to examine the gaps between assess-
ment and importance levels. The construct gaps in organizations A and B are 
presented in Fig 42. As can be seen, in this case, organization B has significantly 
larger gaps than organization A, with Policy and Procedures for Security con-
struct having the largest gap. 
Gap analysis might show that one organization had an overall assess-
ment of 5 in a construct, and if it viewed that construct as only having an im-
portance value of 5, the gap would be zero and the organization might be con-
tent. If another organization had the same overall assessment of 5, but viewed 
                                                          
1 Since assessment and importance values are usually above 4, we show the range 3 to 7 on the graph. 
2 Since construct gaps are usually less than 2.0, we display gap values in multiples of 0.5 from 0 to 2.5. 
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that construct’s importance as being 6, the gap of 1 might indicate an area for 
improvement.  
 
 
Fig 4. Gap analysis in organizations A and B (gap = importance – assessment) 
 
 
For the rest of this paper, we discuss the results of stratified construct 
analysis along other dimensions, such as level within the organization or func-
tional area within the organization. 
Construct Analysis 
Fig 5-A shows the distribution of cybersecurity perceptions (i.e., con-
struct assessment levels) based on the organizational level of the respondents: 
from executive level, to line managers, to professionals. Significant differences 
can be seen: Executives giving generally lower assessments, professions and 
middle managers in the middle, and “Others” with highest assessments.   
Although ratings of assessment and importance are individually im-
portant, the size of the gaps can provide more insights (see Fig 5-B). The results 
show that top-level executives tend to have much higher gaps, across almost all 
constructs, than middle management and non-management personnel. This dis-
parity in perceptions may imply that executives are more dissatisfied with the 
security situation in their organizations. Perhaps executives think situations are 
worse than they really are because they do not understand how and whether 
security measures are being correctly implemented. Or alternatively, executives 
might see problems that people in other roles do not see and, as a result, their 
perceptions of a security gap are higher  
Overall, the sample sizes in this pilot study are small; hence, we use 
these findings to illustrate some of the issues that we expect will be significant 
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in our larger study. We are currently conducting a large-scale study to better 
compare the results across various organizational levels. Follow-up studies and 
case studies would also help further clarify the underlying causes of differences 
in perceptions.  
 
 
 
Fig 5. Assessment levels (A) and gaps (B) by organizational levels in organizations. 
 
 Fig 6 presents the gaps among IT, OT, and other areas in organization 
(such as Marketing, Finance, etc.) Interestingly, OT staff generally have higher 
gaps across the eight constructs. This is consistent with the frequent mention of 
IT/OT cultural gaps. 
 
(A) 
(B) 
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Fig 6. Gaps based on functional areas: information technology (IT), operational technology (OT), 
and other areas 
Conclusion 
In order to identify security strategies and cross-organizational trends, 
we analyzed perceptions of importance and assessment for the eight security 
constructs of the House of Security. In addition to being a unique way to study 
organizational aspects of cybersecurity, this study sheds some light on percep-
tions, which are important, since they are the foundations of decision-making 
in an organization. We believe that the results of this pilot study and our follow-
up large-scale study will have important implications in a number of areas, in-
cluding assessment of an organization’s cybersecurity needs, marketing of cy-
bersecurity products, and development of an organization’s cybersecurity tech-
nologies and policies, which is increasingly important in the renewable energy 
industry.  
 
Opportunity to participate in our large-scale research - Using respondents 
from these two organizations, this research allowed us to conduct a pilot study 
using the survey instrument and analyze the constructs and gaps. In order to 
improve the comparisons, increase the generalizability of the findings, and 
study other dimensions, such as differences among industries, we are 
developing a larger dataset. We invite you and your organization to participate 
in our confidential organization benchmarking exercise, similar to 
organizations A and B in this paper. If you would like more information about 
this opportunity, please contact the corresponding author.  
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APPENDIX 
A. In my organization, I am a/an: 
o Executive (CEO, CFO, VP, etc.) 
o Functional or Line Manager 
o Professional (Consultant, Engineer, In-house Expert, etc.) 
o Other organizational member 
 
B. In my organization, I work in area of: 
o Information Technology (IT) Security 
o IT, but not Security 
o Operational Technology (OT) Security 
o OT, but not Security 
o General / Physical Security 
o Business Security Policy or Management 
o Other, i.e., not in Security, IT, or OT (e.g., Marketing, Accounting, 
HR, etc.), Please specify: ________ 
 
Assessment Scale: 
1= In my view, this security statement is true to a very SMALL extent in my organization. 
7= In my view, this security statement is true to a very LARGE extent in my organization. 
  
Importance Scale: 
1= In my view, it is NOT at all Important that my organization address this security statement. 
7= In my view, it is VERY Important that my organization address this security statement. 
 
1. The organization’s business strategy sets direction for its cybersecurity 
practices. 
2. The organization has adequate safeguards against internal and external 
threats to its data and networks. 
3. In the organization, cybersecurity funds are appropriately distributed. 
4. In the organization, the IT group takes cybersecurity seriously. 
5. The organization’s data and networks are available to approved users. 
6. The organization has adequate policies for when and how data can be shared. 
7. The organization has adequate technology for supporting cybersecurity. 
8. People in the organization carefully follow good cybersecurity practices. 
9. The organization has a well-defined and communicated cybersecurity 
strategy. 
10. Cybersecurity is a funding priority in the organization. 
11. The organization uses its IT security resources effectively to improve 
cybersecurity. 
12. The organization has adequate policies about user identifications, 
passwords, and access privileges. 
 12 
Assessment Scale: 
1= In my view, this security statement is true to a very SMALL extent in my organization. 
7= In my view, this security statement is true to a very LARGE extent in my organization. 
  
Importance Scale: 
1= In my view, it is NOT at all Important that my organization address this security statement. 
7= In my view, it is VERY Important that my organization address this security statement. 
 
13. The organization adequately monitors its data and networks against possible 
attacks. 
14. Cybersecurity is a business agenda item for top executives in the 
organization. 
15. The organization has well-defined policies and procedures for 
cybersecurity. 
16. People in the organization can be trusted to engage in ethical practices with 
data and networks. 
17. The organization has procedures for detecting and punishing cybersecurity 
violations. 
18. In the organization, business managers help set the cybersecurity strategy.
  
19. The organization makes good use of available funds for cybersecurity. 
20. The organization provides good access to data and networks to legitimate 
users. 
21. The organization has a rapid response team ready for action when cyber 
attacks occur. 
22. The organization protects its confidential corporate data. 
23. People in the organization are aware of good cybersecurity practices. 
24. The organization’s data and networks are usually available when needed. 
 
C. What is the biggest concern that you have about cybersecurity? (need not 
be included in the questions above) _____________________________ 
 
D. Any other comments or suggestions? _____________________________ 
 
E. If you would like to receive a copy of our research results, please provide 
your email address:(optional)  Email:  ___________________________
  
We thank you for your time spent taking this survey. 
